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Abstract: Africa's most populous black nations remain underdeveloped, mainly 
due to shambolic industrial sector performance. The rising problems of insecurity, 
corrupt practices, and consumerism structure have made gains from capital 
inflows minimal. Little empirical credence has been leaned to the capital inflow-
industrial output growth relationship in Nigeria. This anomaly has resulted in 
short-sighted policy formulation and attendant consequences. This paper 
examined international capital flows and industrial performance in Nigeria. The 
paper employed the two-step Engle and Granger estimation procedure and the 
Granger Causality to estimates parameters of the indices of industrial output 
growth and capital inflows to Nigeria. Findings revealed that labour participation, 
gross fixed capital formation, foreign direct investment (FDI), and portfolio 
investment had a significant positive relationship with industrial performance in 
Nigeria. Findings also revealed unidirectional causality from labour participation, 
gross fixed capital formation, foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio 
investment to industrial performance in Nigeria. Based on the findings, the 
Nigerian government should create an enabling environment to attract more 
capital inflow that could augment domestic resources with the sole aim of 
growing the industrial sector. 
Keywords: Capital inflow; Industrial performance; Error Correction Model (ECM); 
Granger causality. 






African leaders and their development partners around the world are 
continuously engaged in ensuring poverty is sabotaged in and around the 
continent. Several measures of poverty eradication have been adopted 
with minimal impact (Carter & May 1999).  With the Africa 2063 Agenda in 
focus, industrial growth and development remain the most pervasive 
option for Africa to gain momentum for structural transformation. 
Theoretical and empirical findings (see Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012; Bräutigam 
& Xiaoyang, 2011; Morris & Fessehaie, 2014; Okereke Coke, Geebreyesus, 
Ginbo, Wakeford, & Mulugetta, 2019; Taylor, 2016 for some examples) 
leaned credence to the revolutionary industrial growth in African 
economies and confirm that more strategic industries will not only help 
African countries to amass affluence but also help solve the age-old 
problems of redundancy that have redefined their teeming populations. 
Industrial growth offers viable paths for skill and technology advancement  
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(Aryeetey & Moyo, 2012), wealth creation (Morris & Fessehaie, 2014), youth engagement 
(Okereke et al., 2019), economic divergence (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2014) and many more. 
Thus, it is adjudged to be the most relevant for many African countries, particularly Nigeria 
(World Bank, 2014). The ability of a well-equipped industrial sector to absorb unskilled 
and semi-skilled workforce is second to no other sector in an economy (Daveri & Tabellini, 
2000). Industrialised Africa will be famous not for the commodities-based economic 
approach but rather because of its potentials for higher value-addition and its ability to 
protects the economy from the shocks in global commodity markets (Morris & Fessehaie, 
2014). African countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, have begun 
to intensify efforts to leverage their comparative advantages through specific industrial 
development programmes to break the established global manufacturing value chains in 
many commodities, such as textiles, metal processing, leather, agro-processing primary 
(World Bank, 2013). Even the industrialised nations (the G7-Canada, Germany, France, 
Italy, Japan, UK, and the US) operating service-based economies are recently looking for 
an inventive approach to re-shore their manufacturing (a core of industrialisation) to 
seizure deteriorating growth and employment prospects that are in the time past absent 
(Mahipal & Prasad, 2004). In clear terms, the importance of industrial output growth can 
never be overstated, not least when it comes to the context of development in Nigeria. 
 
With so much attention going into industrial output growth these days, the questions are 
many and unanswered. How relevant is capital inflows to Nigeria as a determinant of 
industrial output growth objectives? What is the nature and volume of capital inflow? 
How much of it goes to the industrial sector? Moreover, how well do they predict 
variations in industrial output growth in Nigeria? These are quite essential questions 
seeing how the industrial sector has always been a significant contributor to growth 
outcomes. With increasingly more countries allowing for cross-border capital mobility, 
the impact of capital inflows on industrial output has become a matter of considerable 
policy relevance. Theoretically, capital inflows can increase access to finance of industries 
and, thereby, promote industrial investment growth, expenditure smoothing, and 
international risk sharing that boost investors’ confidence. Knowing how capital flows 
induce changes in industrial output growth in Nigeria to remain grossly understudied in 
the extant literature of public finance. Apparently, no country-specific study has examined 
capital flows for industrial output growth in Nigeria. Given the growing sophistication of 
capital flow to Nigeria because of rising problems of insecurity and terrorism, weak 
institutional frameworks, arbitrage motives of hedging, exchange rate fluctuations, more 
recent research has focused on identifying types of capital flow that enhance economic 
growth. Little attention has been paid to the role of capital flow-industrial output growth 
relationship in Nigeria. 
 
Another essential issue that has generated debate is the role of capital inflow to jump-
start the growth of the industrial sector. A growing list of studies found a positive 
relationship between financial openness, capital mobility, and economic growth (see De 
Gregorio & Guidotti, 1995; Levine, 1997; Rajan & Zingales, 1998, for example). However, 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) found that welfare gains accruing to the industrial sector 
when finances are sourced across borders to augment domestic savings are negligible 
relative to the welfare gain of take-off when industrial growth in domestic sponsored. The 
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arguments are hinged on the fact that capital inflow to African countries are motivated 
by the act of capitalism from the sending countries (arguments are advanced for inflows 
from Europe and North America). A capitalist-motivated capital flow leaves damaging 
effects on recipient countries in the event of withdrawal of capital, leading to capital flight 
(Efobi & Asongu, 2016). Thus, it leaves an enormous investment gap that creates further 
economic problems. However, non-capitalist motivated capital flows are growth and 
development inclined and thus sustainable (arguments are advanced for inflows from 
China and other Asian countries). Since the onset of the evaluation of gains from capital 
flows, the structural relationship with industrial development remains dimly discerned in 
Nigeria, mainly as it concerns the primary effect of these capital flows for structural 
transformation, which largely hinge on the shift from agrarian to an industrialised 
economy. It is not even entirely clear how capital flow predicts variations in the industrial 
sector of Nigeria. A growing list of studies (see Akinlo, 2004; Buera & Shin, 2017; Osinubi 
& Amaghionyeodiwe, 2010) has focused on the capital flow-economic growth nexus 
neglecting the underlying structural dynamics of capital flow as a predictor of industrial 
output growth in Nigeria. 
 
The industrial development pattern of developing countries has remained sticky even 
when additional foreign investment from abroad is injected (Markusen, 1996). Despite 
the conventional relationship between foreign direct investment flows and growth 
outcomes moving symmetrically, no evidence providing additional financing over 
domestic savings ultimately leads to industrialisation (Brandl & Traxler, 2010). It is clear 
that the inflow of funds spur industrial growth but remains unclear is the magnitude of 
change in industrial output as a result of the rate of change in capital inflow. Prasad, Rajan, 
and Subramanian (2007), in contrast to standard theoretical economic growth models, 
argued that developing countries with low-level industrialisation that have relied more on 
foreign finance had not grown faster in the long run. Similarly, Aizenman, Pinto, and 
Radziwill (2007) argued that the economic growth of developing and emerging markets 
was relatively self-financed when comparing the value of domestic capital against the 
foreign inflow of funds.  
 
This study attempts to lean empirical credence to the capital inflow-industrial output 
growth relationship in Nigeria to inform policy direction and research. We adopt a 
country-specific analytical approach to examine the predictive capacity of capital inflow 
for industrial output growth in Nigeria. We quantify the relationship in their evolution 
over time by rolling the regressions forward over 31 years. Finally, we evaluate the impact 
of critical variables focusing on Nigeria, which is an economy representative of the African 
periphery. We conducted the Granger Causality test to evaluate the direction of causality 
between the variables of interest. We justified that our model does not violate any of the 
assumptions of the classical linear regression model by conducting the various post 
estimation procedure that confirms the reliability of estimates emanating from this study. 
The novelty of the research is in two folds: this study leads the debate on the capital 
inflows-industrial output growth in Nigeria with the aim of coming up with findings that 
can redefine policy and research on the subject matter. This study analyses a new 
perspective by disaggregating capital inflows to study which of the capital inflows 
channels has the most domineering influence on industrial sector performance in Nigeria. 
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By intuition, policy formulation can be tailored towards encouraging such channel of 
capital inflow well above other channels for industrial sector growth and subsequently 
development. The subsequent sections are the literature review, the methodology used, 
then the empirical results and their corresponding interpretations and discussion while 
the last part gives the conclusion and policy recommendations. 
 
Capital inflow and industrial output growth have been discussed along various dimensions 
and geographical landscapes. Oseni, Adekunle, and Alabi (2019) found volatility in the 
exchange rate to predict significant variations in industrial output growth in Nigeria. In 
related findings, Jongbo (2014) advanced arguments for the fluctuating exchange rate as 
a predictor of industrial sector performance. The author relied on the ordinary least 
square and found that the real exchange rate significantly induced variations in industrial 
sector performance in Nigeria. With the attendant heterogeneous influence of exchange 
rate fluctuations, which could appreciate or depreciate, industrial sector performance 
bows to pressures of exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, Adeniyi, Oyinlola, and 
Omisakin (2011) established a linear and positive influence of the exchange rate on the 
industrial sector in Nigeria. In other findings, Okafor, Adegbite, and Abiola (2018) found 
the exchange rate and inflation shock to hurt the growth of the industrial sector in Nigeria. 
It was evident from the review of literature that the contemporaneous influence that 
capital inflows play in the industrial sector development of Nigeria remains grossly 
understudied. 
 
In other country studies that are not entirely on the exact structural relationship between 
capital inflow and industrial performance in Nigeria, Ojedide (2005) studied capital flows 
volatility and macroeconomic performance in Nigeria and found that capital flows are a 
function of the initial stage of the developing country. Consequent to the above, we 
tested the hypothesis that capital inflows would propel the growth in the industrial sector 
of Nigeria, assuming initial conditions were met. In a trivariate country analysis, Herzer 
(2006) relied on the bivariate Vector Autoregressive (VAR) estimation procedure to study 
the FDI-growth causal relationship in Nigeria, Srilanka, Tunisia, and Egypt. Findings 
revealed that FDI catalysed the productivity of the manufacturing sector, which in turn 
speeded up the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product of the countries. Using the 
two-step Engle and Granger estimation procedure, Steve, Samuel, and Bodiseowei (2013) 
found domestic debt to influence foreign aid positively while debt inversely predicted 
economic growth. In their analysis of capital outsourcing and growth of the manufacturing 
sector, Ugwu, Asogwa, and Ugwuanyi (2017) found FDI to predict variations in economic 
growth significantly. 
 
In other climes and across borders, Mensah, Awunyo-Vitor, and Asare-Menako (2013) 
argued that volatility in exchange rate determined Ghana’s manufacturing sector 
employment growth. Based on the empirical credence, we opine that the devaluation of 
the Ghanian Cedis relative to the U.S. Dollars could be responsible for the inefficient 
industrial sector in Ghana. Nonetheless, UNECA (2009) found that religious tension, 
productive and non-productive risks, percentage of oil in total exports, current market 
size, the volume of FDI inflow, pervasive corruption, saving ration, nominal credit to the 
private sector were critical determinants of FDI inflows in Africa. Ojo and Alege (2010) 
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corroborated the findings of UNECA in their empirical analysis of the impact of global 
financial crisis and policy implications on the sudden rise in FDI inflows in twenty-seven 
(27) economies in Sub Saharan Africa. The authors found that output growth co-moved 
with the inflows of FDI in Africa. In other related studies, Chakarabarti (2001) found that 
market factors were the principal determinant of FDI inflows to Africa. Besides, FDI 
inflows were sensitive to real exchange rate movements in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ogun, 
Egwaikkhide & Ogunleye, 2012).  
 
We conclude that little has been done on the empirical validation of capital inflow-
industrial output growth relationship in Nigeria. Evidence on the industrial sector 
performance in Nigeria has been studied against the volatility or fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. How remittances inflows, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, 
and official development assistance in the form of aid predicts variation in Nigeria 
industrial development remains dimly discerned. The intricacies of such omission in the 
literature of industrial sector development in Nigeria underpin this study. Consequent on 
the above, we tested the hypothesis that: 
 
H0: Capital Inflow has no significant relationship with industrial output growth in 
Nigeria  
 






In accounting for industrial performance as induced by capital inflow in Nigeria, the study 
followed the dual gap theory. Developing countries like Nigeria rely on the inflow of funds 
to augments the savings-investment gap. The equilibrating condition of the dual-gap 
model occurs at: 
 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡        (1) 
 
With St representing the national savings level and It is the predominant investment level. 
Nigeria has been predominantly characterized by the low level of domestic savings amidst 
lofty investment objectives so that we obtained the savings investment-gap, which 
created a vacuum for external capital inflow to augment domestic savings to meet the 
lofty investment objectives. The functional relationship of such relationship is expressed 
as: 
 
𝑆𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡     (2) 
 
Unvaryingly, we re-evaluated our capital stock function to include all forms of capital 
inflows: 
 
𝐾𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 = 𝐼𝑡  (3) 
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where Kt defines the capital stock parameter, St is the national savings level, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡  is 
the capital inflow options to the country, δ measures depreciation of capital, and It is the 
predominant investment level. 
   




∝      (4) 
 
Yt represents the output growth of the industry; Lt measures output per unit of effective 
labour; Kt represents output per unit of effective capital, and 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡  is the capital 
inflows to the country. The capital inflow-industrial output growth induced model is 
expressed as: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡 = 𝐴 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐴𝐿𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝐾𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ∑ 𝜔𝑛𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡  (5) 
 
where 𝛾, 𝜋, and 𝜔, are the elasticities of human capital (L), physical capital (K), and capital 
flows, respectively. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡  is industrial output growth in Nigeria, 𝐴 is the efficiency of 
the productive economy, 𝐴𝐿  is labour force or the working population, 𝑘𝑡 is domestic 
capital stock, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡 is a capital inflow to Nigeria, and t is the time series characteristics 
of the data set (1987-2017). Given the purpose of this study which is to examine the effect 
of capital flow on industrial output growth, we took the semi-logarithms and time 
derivatives of equation (5) to generate the following dynamic function: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡 = 𝐴 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐴𝐿𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 (6) 
 
Explicitly, the explanatory model intended to capture the dynamics of industrial output 
growth was expressed in equation (7)  
 
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡 = 𝐴 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐴𝐿𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝑛=1





𝑖 + ∑ 𝜕𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉 𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡    (7) 
 
where 𝛾, 𝜋, 𝜔, ∅, ∞, and 𝜕, are the elasticities of human capital (L), physical capital (K), 
FDI, remittances, official development assistance, portfolio investment, respectively. 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡  is industrial output growth in Nigeria, 𝐴  is the efficiency of the productive 
economy, 𝐴𝐿 is labour force or the working population, 𝑘𝑡 is domestic capital stock, 𝐹𝐷𝐼 
is the foreign direct investment to Nigeria, 𝑅𝐸𝑀 is remittances inflow to Nigeria, 𝑂𝐷𝐴 is 
official development assistance to Nigeria, 𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉  is portfolio investment to Nigeria, t 
defines the time parameter of the model. 
 
Our study used annual time series data for indices of capital flows and industrial output 
growth from 1987 through 2017. The choice of Nigeria was guided by the desire to explain 
the structural transformation of the Nigerian industrial sector with the attendant 
consequences of capital inflows. This study was also guided by the availability of reliable 
data on aggregates of capital inflows and associative consequences. Capital inflows were 
measured employing foreign direct investment, official development assistance, portfolio 
investment, and remittances as used in the work of Edwards (1990); Calvo (1998); Reisen  
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Table 1 Variable Description 
Abbreviation Variable Measured As Source 
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 Industrial Output 
Growth in Nigeria 
Industry Value Added World Development Indicator 
(WDI), 2017 
𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕 Labour Labour Participation Rate World Development Indicator 
(WDI), 2017 
𝑲𝒊𝒕 Capital Stock Gross Fixed Capital Formation World Development Indicator 
(WDI), 2017 
𝑭𝑫𝑰 Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Net Foreign Direct Investment 
Inflows 
World Development Indicator 
(WDI), 2017 






Assistance to developing 
nations 




Portfolio Investment  World Development Indicator 
(WDI), 2017 
Source: Authors, 2020 
 
and Soto (2001); Schneider (2003); De Vita and Kyaw (2008); Opperman and Adjasi (2017). 
However, industrial output growth was measured utilizing industry value added as in 
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas (2014); Bezić, Galović, and Mišević (2016); Filer and 
Stanišić (2016); Galović, Bezić, and Mišević (2018). We relied on data from the World Bank 
Database (World Bank, 2017). The variables used in this study are described in Table 1. 
 
We presented the pre-estimation analysis from the descriptive statistics and the unit root 
test. The descriptive analysis confirmed the normality condition of the data sets. The unit 
root establishes the order of integration of the variables and subsequently informs the 
estimation strategy to be adopted. We proceed to estimate the cointegration test to 
confirm the existence of long-run covariance among the variables (Johansen & Juselius, 
1990; Pesaran & Shin, 2012; Wang & Wu, 2012). The Trace Statistics and Maximum 
Eigenvalue can be estimated from the Eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix. We proceed 
to estimate the two-step Engle and Granger estimation procedure to adjust long run-
convergence behaviour to suit gradual short-run equilibrium (Engle & Granger, 2015). 
Also, we estimated the Granger causality test to determine the lag-order in the causation 
model (Eichler, 2007). 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
The descriptive statistics of the data provided vital information about the sample series, 
such as the mean, median, minimum and maximum values, and the distribution of the 
sample measured by the skewness, kurtosis, and Jaque-Bera statistics. 
 
The summary statistics result in Table 2 reveals a high tendency for normal distribution 
(mean and median values lie within the maximum and minimum values). We found 
positively skewed series and platykurtic distributions with flat tail relative to the normal 
distribution (values less than three (3)). We discovered the series to be normally  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 𝑳𝒕 𝑲𝒕 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒕 𝑹𝑬𝑴𝒕 𝑶𝑫𝑨𝒕 𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑻𝑰𝑵𝑽𝒕 
Mean 7.5001 3.3613 2.6501 4.7086 3.3613 2.6502 4.7086 
Median 7.4401 3.0121 2.9101 3.9492 3.0121 2.9101 3.9492 
Maximum 9.1101 8.8325 3.9901 5.4258 4.8326 3.5421 5.4258 
Minimum 5.2301 0.6426 1.6209 2.2513 1.6426 1.6439 2.2232 
Std. Dev. 2.0001 2.2081 8.3209 3.5653 2.2081 2.4303 1.3368 
Skewness 1.3093 1.8801 1.5863 1.9769 1.8801 2.5863 2.9769 
Kurtosis 1.6697 2.9775 2.1772 1.0603 2.9772 2.1707 2.2357 
Jargue-Bera 2.3312 2.4533 2.2349 4.1402 3.4221 2.2342 1.1046 
Probability 0.3016 0.5562 0.2305 0.1183 0.4302 0.3271 0.5126 
Observation 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Source: Authors, 2020 
 
distributed consequent upon probability values that were non-significant at a 5% level of 
significance. 
 
Unit Root Test 
 













𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 -0.5773 -3.3737 -4.3332 -1.4334 I (1) 
𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕 -1.3323 -2.4333 -3.4331 -2.5888 I (1) 
𝑲𝒊𝒕 0.7447 -1.5531 -3.2332 -1.6632 I (1) 
𝑭𝑫𝑰 3.5523 -1.8203 -4.6682 -3.5626 I (1) 
𝑹𝑬𝑴 -2.3682 -5.5236 -3.6362 -1.3322 I (1) 
𝑶𝑫𝑨 1.1221 1.0032 -2.3222 -1.3222 I (1) 
𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑻𝑰𝑵𝑽 -1.3772` -2.9511 -2.6631 -1.57231 I (1) 
Source: Authors, 2020 
Note: The summary statistics were computed before taking the natural logs 
 
We found the first differenced stationarity order across all series in the data set. We 
proceed to estimate the two-step Engle and Granger error correction estimation 
procedure to gradually adjust from the long run converging characteristics of the variables 
to the short-run equilibrating position. The error correction model thwarts long-run 
convergence in the parameterisation of the variables for short-run gradual equilibrium 
(Engle & Granger, 2015). The error correction model to be estimated is specified as: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡 = 𝐴 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐴𝐿𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ∑ 𝜔𝑛𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡
𝑛=1





𝑖 + ∑ 𝜕𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑛=1
𝑖 + ℵ𝐸𝐶𝑀(−1) + 𝜇𝑡  
 
All other variables remained as earlier defined except 𝐸𝐶𝑀(−1) which is the error 
correction component of the model that gradually adjust frontal long-run convergence to 
short-run equilibrating conditions, and ℵ  is the coefficient of the error correction 
component that gives the speed of adjustment back to short term equilibrium.  
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Optimal Lag Length Selection 
 
Table 4 Optimal Lag Length Selection 
Lag length AIC 
0 4.7838 
1 2.5622* 
Source: Authors, 2020 
Notes * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 
Error correction modelling procedure is sensitive to lag length because of the time-varying 
parameters of the model adjustment. We relied on the Akaike Information Criteria to 
choose the optimal lag length for our industrial performance model. The information 
criteria with the lowest statistics in the corresponding lag-order selection give the 
optimal. 
 
Lag length one (1) is optimal based on the result presented in Table 4. We proceed to 




We drew inferences at 5% in the Tace and Maximum Eigen Values Statistics. 
 
Table 5 Result of Johansen Co-integration test based on Trace Statistic and Max 
Eigenvalue 
  Trace Statistic Max. Eigen Value 











None * 0.74 138.42 95.75 0.00* 44.52 40.10 0.01* 
At most 1 * 0.69 93.91 69.82 0.00* 38.61 33.88 0.01* 
At most 2* 0.53 55.29 47.86 0.01* 25.50 27.58 0.04* 
At most 3* 0.42 29.80 29.80 0.05* 18.17 21.13 0.03* 
At most 4 0.21 11.63 15.50 0.18 7.86 14.26 0.03* 
Source: Authors, 2020 
Notes: Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 5% level; Max-eigenvalue test 
indicates 5 cointegration at the 5% level; * rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level; 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
We confirmed the existence of a long-run relationship since we rejected the null of no 
cointegration. We proceed to estimate the two-step Engle and Granger estimation 
procedure.  
 
Table 6 presents the result of the two-step Engle and Granger error correction procedure. 
The estimated coefficient of the error correction vector was 0.4591, implying that the 
error correction term gradually adjusted back to the short-run equilibrating position at 
the rate of 56.72 per cent. The coefficient of the error correction term was appropriately 
signed and significant at 1% level of significance. 
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Table 6 Two-Step Engle and Granger Error Correction Result 
DEP.VAR.: 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
A 0.1440 2.7373 0.0001** 
𝑨𝑳𝒊𝒕 0.1193 2.6363 0.0234* 
𝑲𝒊𝒕 0.8734 2.8562 0.0421* 
𝑭𝑫𝑰 0.5662 3.6372 0.0432* 
𝑹𝑬𝑴 0.1916 2.7237 0.1255 
𝑶𝑫𝑨 -0.4591 -1.0983 0.3014 
𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑻𝑰𝑵𝑽 0.6895 2.7281 0.0167* 
𝑬𝑪𝑴(−𝟏) -0.5672 -2.9273 0.0014* 
R-squared 0.7162 
Adjusted R2 0.5129 
F-statistic 45.2321 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000** 
 Durbin-Watson stat 2.0544 
Source: Authors, 2020 
**(1%) *(5%) indicates significance levels 
 
The coefficient of error correction implies that about 57% of the previous year's 
disequilibrium in the economy’s industrial sector was revolved around its short run 
equilibrating position. Short-run estimates revealed that all the explanatory variables 
except official development assistance and portfolio investment induced a linear and 
positive relationship with industrial output growth in Nigeria. Explicitly, a percentage 
increase in the labour participation rate will result in an 11.93 per cent increase in 
Industrial Output in Nigeria. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) found similar results for several 
industrialised economies. Nevertheless, a percentage increase in capital formation will 
result in an 87.34 per cent increase in Industrial Output in Nigeria. This finding aligns with 
the work of Oded (2011) and Oketch (2006). Furthermore, a percentage increase in 
foreign direct investment will result in a 56.62 per cent increase in Industrial Output in 
Nigeria, as also revealed by Onanuga, Odusanaya, and Adekunle (2020). Finally, a 
percentage increase in portfolio investment will result in a 68.95 per cent increase in 
Industrial Output in Nigeria, which also corroborating the findings of Onanuga, 
Odusanaya, and Adekunle (2020). However, remittances and official development 
assistance were found not to statistically determine industrial output growth in Nigeria at 
any level of significance. It implies that they did not predict variations in industrial output 
growth in Nigeria.  
 
The value of the adjusted R2 of 0.5129 indicates that explanatory variables of the model 
explained 51.29% of variations in industrial output growth in Nigeria, while the remaining 
48.71% were captured outside the model. The Durbin Watson value of 2.0544 implies that 
the model was free from problems of serial correlation because it fell within the 
acceptance range of 1.5 to 2.5. The F-statistics of 45.2321 was statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level, indicating that the explanatory variables were jointly significant, 
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Granger Causality Test 
 
In gauging the causation lag order of the capital inflow-industrial output relationship, we 
regressed the dependent variable “ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡 ” on its own one period lag and the one-
period lag of the regressors. We tested the null hypothesis of joint zero coefficients in the 
lagged regressors. By inference, failure to reject the null is equivalent to failure to reject 
the hypothesis that one-period lag of the regressors does not Granger cause industrial 
output in Nigeria. We expressed the causality model as: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡 =∝𝑜+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐴𝐿𝑡−𝑗
𝑝2
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑡−𝑘
𝑝3





𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑤𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−𝑤
𝑝5
𝑤=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑧𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−𝑧
𝑝5
𝑧=1 + 𝜇𝑡  (8) 
 
To test the non-Granger causality from 𝐴𝐿𝑡 ,  𝐾𝑡 , 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 , 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 , 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡 and 𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡 to  
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑡 , we tested the nullity of all coefficients,  𝛽𝑗, 𝛽𝑘,𝛽𝑣 , 𝛽𝑚 , 𝛽𝑤and 𝛽𝑧 
 
The pairwise Granger Causality test results are given in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Granger Causality Result  
Null hypothesis: X does not Granger Cause Y F-Statistics Probability 
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 → 𝑨𝑳𝒕 1.6343 0.7723 
𝑨𝑳𝒕 → 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 0.5432 0.0043** 
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 → 𝑲𝒕 2.5362 0.4170 
𝑲𝒕 → 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 0.4378 0.0052** 
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 → 𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒕 1.4526 0.1238 
𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒕 → 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 4.5623 0.0004** 
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 → 𝑹𝑬𝑴𝒕 0.6272 0.6621 
𝑹𝑬𝑴𝒕 → 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕  1.3838 0.7372 
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 → 𝑶𝑫𝑨𝒕 2.9213 0.5366 
𝑶𝑫𝑨𝒕 → 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 2.6782 0.3521 
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 → 𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑻𝑰𝑵𝑽𝒕 0.6342 0.9882 
𝑷𝑶𝑹𝑻𝑰𝑵𝑽𝒕 → 𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑼𝑻𝒕 2.8821 0.0234* 
Source: Authors, 2020 
**(1%) *(5%) indicates significance levels 
 
The result in Table 7 indicates that there is unidirectional causality from labour 
participation, gross fixed capital formation (a measure of capital), FDI, and portfolio 
investment to industrial output growth in Nigeria. Hence, labour participation, gross fixed 
capital formation, FDI, and portfolio investment granger caused industrial output growth 
in Nigeria. The findings of this study agree with the findings of Singh (2012). 
 
Table 8 Serial Correlation Test 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
F-statistic 0.5262     Prob. F (7,24) 0.2312 
Obs*R-squared 2.6263     Prob. Chi-Square (7) 0.4552 
Source: Authors, 2020 
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Given the probability value of 45.52 per cent, we failed to reject the null hypothesis and 
concluded that our short-run model was free from problems of serial correlation. 
 
Table 9 Heteroscedasticity Test Result 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroscedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.565126 Prob. F (7,24) 0.5357 
Obs*R-squared 10.75370 Prob. Chi-Square (7) 0.9273 
Source: Authors, 2020 
 
Given the probability value of 92.73 per cent, we failed to reject the null hypothesis and 
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Figure 1 CUSUM Stability Test 
Source: Authors, 2020 
 
The above figure shows that the CUSUM line is within the critical bounds of 5 per cent 





Despite the significance of capital outsourcing as an alternative source of investment 
financing, the empirical connections between capital inflows and industrial output growth 
in Nigeria remain grossly understudied. Previous studies on the industrial development 
discourse in Nigeria have focused on the influence of exchange rate volatility or 
fluctuations in the industrial sector development literature in Nigeria. Little was done to 
establish the contemporaneous influence of the various source of capital inflow on 
industrial sector growth. Which of these channels of capital inflows is more pervasive and 
efficient? It is an important research question for policy information research redefinition 
in Nigeria. This study relied on aggregate indices of capital inflows (remittances inflows, 
official development assistance (ODA), FDI inflows, and portfolio investment) and 
industrial sector development from 1987 through 2017 to lean empirical credence to the 
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relationship. We found that an increased labour participation rate was essential for the 
increase in industrial output in Nigeria, just as Daveri and Tabellini (2000) have stressed 
in their findings. Domestic and international capital inflow jointly aided narrowing a wide 
investment gap in Nigeria, which is in consonance with Oded (2011); Oketch (2006) and 
Onanuga, Odusanaya, and Adekunle (2020). However, remittances and official 
development were anathemas to industrial output growth in Nigeria, mainly owing to the 
unproductive role remittances play in the African space. Remittances are mainly used for 
consumption, which in pure form does not generate a return in itself. Development 
assistance is usually mismanaged owing mainly to the political motives that are 
associated. Labour participation, gross fixed capital formation, FDI, and portfolio 
investment granger caused industrial output growth in Nigeria, thus, corroborating the 
findings of Singh (2012). This study’s novelty is two-fold. Firstly, it leads to the debate on 
capital inflows and industrial sector development in Nigeria. Secondly, this study relied on 
the two-step Engle and Granger estimation procedure to establish a baseline asymptotic 
relationship between capital inflow and industrial sector performance in Nigeria. 
 
Based on the findings, this paper recommends that Nigerian government should see 
inflows of foreign capital as a viable catalyst that can propel the expansion of the country`s 
industrial sector, and the policymakers in the economy should embark on policy measures 
that will ensure the sustainability of foreign direct investment inflows and external debt 
towards the direction of industrial sectors in Nigeria. In the same vein, a more significant 
percentage of remittances should be tailored towards the industrial sector in the country. 
If their foreign capital flows are sustained, there will be an industrial revolution in the 
economy in the nearest future.  
 
This study is limited to the facts obtained from the interactions of aggregates data on 
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